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The senior management sensemaking paradox 
Abstract  
Purpose ± From a complexity leadership theory perspective, leadership stops being seen as 
residing in an individual, and comes to be conceived as emergent from the myriad  interactions 
among organizational members. However, in spite of this reconceptualization, organizations still 
have senior managers (e.g. the CEO) who are supposed to be leading, and thus, the purpose of this 
paper is to explore, then, who are these senior managers and what challenges emerge for them 
under a complexity leadership perspective. 
Design/methodology/approach ± This paper reviews first the literature on complexity theory and 
leadership, and then, conceptually develops an understanding of the challenges that senior 
managers might face under complexity. 
Findings ± The main finding and focus of the paper is that, from a complexity perspective, a 
paradox emerges regarding senior managers. On the one hand, senior managers might need to 
make sense of their limitations and the unowned essence of the processes that surround them. On 
the other hand, their subordinates might still insist on portraying senior managers as final causes 
of all success or failure. 
Originality/value ± This paper presents a novel way to re-conceptualize senior managers, under 
a complexity perspective, where they come to be perceived as trapped in a paradox of contradictory 
sensemaking processes: as they come to find out all that is outside of their control their 
subordinates insist on making them responsible for everything as if they had control.  
Keywords 
Complexity, leadership, senior management, complexity leadership, complex adaptive system, 
paradox 
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Complexity theory has come to change the way we envision and understand organizations and 
their environments. Complexity theory is an interdisciplinary theory, which has found broad and 
interesting applications in many different disciplines (Allen and Boulton, 2011; McMillan, 2004). 
From physics, to chemistry, biology, economics and organization science, complexity theory has 
come to change the ways we think about the world (Anderson, 1999). From a complexity 
perspective, organizations and their environments are conceived as possible complex adaptive 
systems, where  myriad  agents interact with each other in non-simple ways generating a whole 
that, if complex, cannot be adequately reduced to the sum of its parts (McMillan, 2004; Simon, 
1962; Stacey, 1995). Complexity has made its way into leadership studies, and a complexity 
leadership theory appears to be developing and emerging (Marion and Uhl-Bien, 2001; Uhl-Bien 
et al., 2007). In a recent paper in the Journal of Strategy and Management, Kriger and 
Zhovtobryukh (2013) have argued that leadership is not the doing of one single individual. And it 
is precisely that which complexity leadership states. In complexity, leadership comes to be 
conceived as a systemic process of self-organization. A distributed phenomenon that is no longer 
represented by one individual (Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009)EXWWKDWLVEHVWGHILQHGDV³«a 
recognizable pattern of social and relational organizing among autonomous heterogeneous 
LQGLYLGXDOVDVWKH\IRUPLQWRDV\VWHPRIDFWLRQ´(Hazy and Uhl-Bien, 2013: 80). Such a view on 
leadership has created, therefore, a dilemma for senior managers, because if organizations can lead 
and organize themselves (i.e. self-organization), then what is the role for those at the top of the 
organization? At the end of the day, even if organizations self-organize, it is clear that 
organizations still have senior managers at the top, who are supposed to be leading. More 
importantly, these senior managers tend to be those who are paid more than anyone else in the 
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organization and have access to more resources than anyone else too (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984; Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 2002; Quigley and Hambrick, 2015).  
To solve this dilemma, some have claimed that senior managers are enablers of the 
complex dynamics through which an organization could organize and lead itself (Lichtenstein and 
Plowman, 2009; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). Thus, it has been said that senior managers could become 
enablers of the interactions that are needed for self-organization to emerge (Hazy and Uhl-Bien, 
2013; Marion and Uhl-Bien, 2001). Among those roles that senior managers as enablers play, an 
important one is that of sensemakers or  facilitators of sensemaking in the organization (Gioia and 
Chittipeddi, 1991; Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009; Pye, 2005). Such an important activity of 
sensemaking, demands from senior managers to be co-creators or co-authors of meaning and share 
it (i.e. sensegiving) to other individuals in the organization. Of course, the challenge emerges as 
VHQLRU PDQDJHUV DUH QRW WKH RQO\ RQHV VHQVHPDNLQJ DQG VHQVHJLYLQJ $FWXDOO\ ³in complex 
environments«when timely action is needed  as  events  unfold,  greater  emphasis is  placed  on  
determining  who  will  have  how much  influence  rather  than  focusing  on  building  a  centralised  
process´ (Hazy, 2012: 53). So that the strategic response of organizations, as strategy as practice 
has extensively argued (Johnson et al., 2003), is the product of the sensemaking and sensegiving 
of many different actors throughout the organization (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Vaara and 
Whittington, 2012). Some of them might be working at lower levels in the organization, yet their 
work -including their sensemaking and sensegiving- remains HVVHQWLDO DV ³OHDGership  at  the  
organization  level  is  highly contingent and dependent upon learning and adaptation at lower 
levels in the system´ (Hazy, 2008: 301). 7KXV ZKLOH VHQLRU PDQDJHUV¶ VHQVHPDNLQJ DQG
sensegiving is highly influential in organizations, other groups might be going through their own 
sensemaking processes, and arriving perhaps simultaneously to differing meanings and 
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interpretations. For example, based on the romance of leadership literature (Bligh et al., 2011; 
Meindl et al., 1985)RUWKHZRUNRI*DEULHORQIROORZHUV¶IDQWDVLHV (1997, 2011), it is possible that 
VRPHWLPHVIROORZHUV¶VHQVHPDNLQJGHULYHVLQWKHLUDSRWKHRVLVRIWKHLUOHDGHUVVXFKDVWKHLUVHQLRU
managers. While, on the other hand, because of complexity, senior managers might be finding out 
that actually they are far more subjected, restricted, and impotent than their followers might 
acknowledge, as  leading  an organization is the result of complex systemic processes, some of 
WKHPEH\RQGVHQLRUPDQDJHUV¶ken. The convergence of these differing sensemaking processes, 
thus, will be presented in this paper as the root of a fundamental paradox for senior managers: they 
might realize their limitations and impotence while others in the organization might be expecting 
them to be in control.   
In this essay, therefore, I will argue for a senior management sensemaking paradox, which 
emerges from complexity leadership theory. In order to present and discuss the senior management 
sensemaking paradox, I will first provide a basic introduction to complexity theory and its 
propositions, followed by a summary on what complexity theory has contributed to leadership 
studies. After this, I will discuss how in a complexity perspective, senior managers are put in a 
tense position, where as they realize that organizations and their external environments can lead 
themselves, they come to face how much is outside their control. In other words, senior managers 
come to perceive the world as outside of their control. By contrast, at the same time, their 
subordinates might demand from senior managers to present themselves as full causes of all good 
or bad in the organization. For most people in organizations, pretending that senior managers are 
responsible for all the good and bad that happens in the organization is a way to avoid how complex 
the world can be and how sometimes nobody is in charge, and therefore, it represents a simplistic 
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understanding that puts most people at ease and away from the anxiety and uncomfortableness that 
complex environments might generate. 
 In summary, in organizations there are differing sensemaking processes that converge in 
the same space. On the one hand, senior managers might be making sense of how in complex 
organizations it is the system which leads itself, and thus, a lot lies beyond VHQLRU PDQDJHUV¶
control. On the other hand, the subordinates of senior managers might try to avoid the complexity 
of the world by pretending that senior managers have full control of all that happens. This, 
therefore, creates a paradox: the senior management paradox.  
 
Complexity 
Complex adaptive systems are characterized by the non-simple interactions among a plethora of 
elements. Through such non-simple interactions, elements of a system impart to each other some 
of their own individual behaviors, while at the same time no two elements of the system behaving 
completely the same (Hazy and Uhl-Bien, 2013; Marion and Uhl-Bien, 2001). Particularly, in a 
complex adaptive system some of the core elements of the system are agents, who ³«are partially 
connected to one another, so that the behavior of a particular agent depends on the behavior (or 
VWDWHRI VRPH VXEVHWRI DOO WKH DJHQWV LQ WKH V\VWHP´ (Anderson, 1999: 219). This means that 
complex adaptive systems are characterized by feedback loops through which the outputs that an 
individual agent contributes to the system could come back in a distorted way as an input to 
influence again the same agent. What particularly characterizes a complex adaptive system is that 
what emerges from the interaction of all its constituent elements cannot be adequately described 
as the sum of its parts (Anderson, 1999; McMillan, 2004; Stacey, 1995). This means that in a 
complex adaptive V\VWHP³«group behavior is more than simpO\WKHVXPRILQGLYLGXDOEHKDYLRUV´
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(Stacey, 1995: 481). Therefore, it is said that complex adaptive systems are nonlinear systems, 
where the interaction among constituent elements is compositional, which, thus, involves ³«an 
interaction of units that chanJHVWKHLUFRPELQHGFKDUDFWHULQIXQGDPHQWDOZD\V´(Lord et al., 2011: 
108).  
 In a complex adaptive system, causal relationships become much more opaque. This means 
WKDW³«links between specific causes and specific effects, between specific actions and specific 
RXWFRPHVDUHORVWLQWKHFRPSOH[LW\RIZKDWKDSSHQV´(Stacey, 1995: 483). Moreover, in complex 
adaptive systems, their dependency to initial and past conditions is highly important too (Arthur, 
1999; Boisot and McKelvey, 2010). Small variations in initial or past conditions in the system 
could sometimes have large effects on the system (Anderson, 1999). This includes what has been 
popularly described as the butterfly effect (Boisot and McKelvey, 2010). More importantly, 
complex adaptive systems are paradoxical, because even though they might be unpredictable and 
constantly taking unexpected states, they WHQGWREHFRQVWUDLQHGWR³«a strange attractor, a limited 
UHJLRQRIWKHVWDWHVSDFHZLWKLQZKLFKWKHV\VWHPVWD\VSHUPDQHQWO\´ (Anderson, 1999: 219).  
&RPSOH[DGDSWLYHV\VWHPV³«are unique and desirable in their ability to adapt rapidly and 
FUHDWLYHO\ WRHQYLURQPHQWDOFKDQJHV´ (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007: 303). A peculiar characteristic of 
complex adaptive systems is that the system and/or its constituent elements have a schema or 
schemata of their world and how it might work. Thus, in a complex adaptive system ³«the system 
has within itself a model of its environment that it uses to influence present behavior in anticipation 
RI IXWXUH HYHQWV´ (Mikulecky, 2001: 347). From a complexity perspective, organizations, 
particularly modern large organizations, come to be conceived as possible complex adaptive 
systems. More importantly, they come to be seen as possible complex adaptive systems nested 
within others. In other words, an organization does not usually exist in isolation. Organizations are 
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embedded in broader, technological (Bower and Christensen, 1995), social (Meyer, 1982), 
economic, regulatory (Cook et al., 1983; Cook et al., 1985; Mahon and Murray, 1981; Smith and 
Mick, 1985), political (Bradshaw-Camball and Murray, 1991; Levy and Egan, 2003; Mueller et 
al., 2013), and natural external environments, which themselves could be complex systems. For 
example, the national or global economy that surrounds an organization is likely complex itself 
(Arthur, 1999). 
 There is no question that complex adaptive systems can be quite difficult to understand, 
particularly because they can be paradoxical in their evolution and behavior. For example, in 
complex adaptive V\VWHPV ³$W VRPH SRLQW D FULWLFDO PDVV occurs« DQG VRPHWKLQJ EHFRPHV
LQHYLWDEOH´ (Marion and Uhl-Bien, 2001: 402). That inevitableness might, sometimes, be the 
V\VWHP¶V FROODSVH (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; McMillan, 2004). Nonetheless, that 
inevitableness might, sometimes, be emergent self-organization. In other words, at the higher 
aggregate level of the system, some sort of self-organization could emerge, which tends to be the 
UHVXOW RI ³«interdependent relationships« (auto-coordination) DQG« constraints imposed by 
DFWLRQV H[WHUQDO WR WKH LQIRUPDO G\QDPLF LQFOXGLQJ HQYLURQPHQWDO UHVWULFWLRQV« DQG
DGPLQLVWUDWLYHFRQWUROV´(Uhl-Bien et al., 2007: 304). This process of self-organization in social 
systems, such as organizations, is largely the result of overall systemic negotiations of meanings 
and interpretations within the organization (Weick and Roberts, 1993; Brown et al., 2015). So that 
as groups of people manage to reach a level of shared meanings, their efforts could become aligned, 
and therefore, the people become led by these understandings and meanings they have negotiated 
(Fairhurst and Connaughton, 2014; Mabey, 2013). +HQFH³democracy and power equalization´ 
become vehicles that ³create the conditions for self-organization´ (Burnes, 2005: 85). Thus, 
through self-organization an organization could potentially lead itself. In other words, in complex 
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adaptive systems it might be the system that leads and not one single heroic leader. Therefore, this 
has produced an alternative perspective of leadership, where ³«UDWKHUWKDQEHLQJ³LQ´VRPHRQH
leadership ± understood as the capacity to influence others ± can be enacted within every 
LQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQPHPEHUV,QWKLVVHQVHFRPSOH[LW\
VIRFXVIRUOHDGHUVKLSLVOLWHUDOO\WKH³VSDFH
beWZHHQ´ LQGLYLGXDOV´ (Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009: 618). However, the essential point to 
mention is that negotiating meaning and direction -sensemaking- is usually contested and 
controversial, as different groups within the same organization might be arriving at different 
meanings and directions. It is from the convergence of these differing understandings that the 
VHQLRUPDQDJHUV¶VHQVHPDNLQJSDUDGR[HPHUJHVDV,ZLOOVKRZLQWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ 
 
Complexity leadership: the dilemma 
Conceiving leadership as emerging from the interactions within the system, obviously generates a 
dilemma in terms of senior managers. Classically, the senior managers of an organization were 
portrayed as sitting at the top of the organization and being responsible for leading the organization 
through the strategies they formulate (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Katzenbach, 
1997; Mintzberg et al., 2002). However, as I have already argued, from a complexity perspective 
organizations might lead themselves through emergent self-organization. Yet, we still have senior 
managers in most organizations, and they are usually the best paid employees, and at least partially 
they do play some role in explaining organizational performance (Helfat and Peteraf, 2014; 
Quigley and Hambrick, 2015). Thus, the question that emerges is, from a complexity perspective, 
what are these senior managers doing or what could/should they do? The standard argument is that 
senior managers might become enablers of the complex process of emergent self-organization. 
Therefore, senior managers could enable interactions among people in the organization, they could 
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energize the organization with new hires, they could set boundaries for the emergent process by 
defining the businesses in which the organization would operate, and they could become symbols 
of change initiatives , among many other roles that have been argued (Anderson, 1999; 
Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009; Marion and Uhl-Bien, 2001; Stacey, 1995; Uhl-Bien et al., 
2007). Another important role for senior managers, from a complexity perspective, is that of 
sensemakers and sensegivers (Maitlis and Christianson, 2014; Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007; Pye, 
2005; Whittle et al., 2015). By developing interpretations of what is going on (i.e. sensemaking) 
and sharing these interpretations with their subordinates (i.e. sensegiving), senior managers could 
potentially enable interaction, as they could foster shared interpretations that could generate a basis 
for interaction and self-organization. Hence, senior managers FRXOG³«see new possibilities for 
WKH«>RUJDQL]DWLRQ@E\PDNLQJVHQVHRIZKDWZDVKDSSHQLQJDQGDUWIXOO\JLYLQJPHDQLQJDQG
SXUSRVHWRZKDWZDVHPHUJLQJ´(Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009: 624). 
  
The senior management sensemaking paradox 
A paradox LQYROYHV³&RQWUDGLFWRU\\HWLQWHUUHODWHGHOHPHQWVWKDWH[LVWVLPXOWDQHRXVO\DQGSHUVLVW
over time. Such elements seem logical when considered in isolation, but irrational, inconsistent, 
HYHQDEVXUGZKHQMX[WDSRVHG´(Lewis et al., 2014: 58). In order to present the senior management 
sensemaking paradox, I will describe first, separately, the two different faces of it, followed by 
juxtaposing them, in order to show how the paradox arises. 
&HQWUDOWRDQ\FRPSOH[LW\GLVFXVVLRQLV$VEK\¶VSULQFLSOHRIUHTXLVLWHYDULHW\6LPSO\SXW
WKHSULQFLSOHRIUHTXLVLWHYDULHW\VWDWHVWKDW³7KHDGDSWLYHFDSDFLW\RIFRPSOH[V\VWHPVLVWKRXJKW
to depend on the match between internal complexity in an organization and the complexity of its 
HQYLURQPHQW´(Lord et al., 2011: 105). This means that for a system to survive it might need to 
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mirror the complexity of its environment. In terms of senior managementZKDW$VEK\¶VSULQFLSOH
might demand is for senior managers and their sensemaking to mirror the complexity of their 
environments. Therefore, senior managers¶VHQVHPDNLQJ needs arguably to be as complex as the 
environments in which senior managers are embedded. Furthermore, as I explained at the 
beginning of this essay, in current times and especially in currently large organizations, both the 
internal and external environments (Shepherd and Rudd, 2014) that surround senior managers 
could be quite complex (Allen et al., 2007; Stacey, 1995; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). In addition, 
external environments are constantly changing and their change can rarely be accurately predicted 
(Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009; Barreto, 2010; Easterby-Smith et al., 2009; Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997). Thus, organizations are themselves continuously 
morphing to try to link and fit with the external environment (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Gavetti 
and Rivkin, 2007; Rindova and Kotha, 2001). In other words, senior managers could be surrounded 
by staggering complex external and internal environments that could easily overwhelm them. 
Environments as these were clearly described, for instance, by Mackay and Chia (2013) in their 
case study of a Canadian automotive company. They described how the company faced constant 
change in its external environment, such as changes in the needs of their buyers, changes in the 
market including shifts in truck demand, the global financial crisis, and then, the impact of the 
global fLQDQFLDOFULVLVRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶V buyers. Under such complex conditions, Mackay and Chia 
argue that senior managers¶GHFLVLRQs are necessarily incomplete as they cannot ever really predict 
the full consequences of their decisions, which leads to a series of unavoidable unintended 
consequences (2013; Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Thus, one of senior 
managers¶PDLQVHQVHPDNLQJFKDOOHQJHVXQGHUWKHVHFRQGLWLRQVLVWRUHDOL]HWKHLQFRPSOHWHQHVV
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of their decisions, all that lies beyond their control, and that in spite of all they can actually do, in 
the end, overall strategic change processes remain mainly beyond their full control.  
The global financial crisis of 2008/09 would be an example of such a complex 
environment. The crisis certainly changed and deeply affected the environment under which many 
organizations work. However, there is no one single person or group of people that could be held 
solely accountable for what happened. Even though the causes of the crisis are far more complex 
than I could actually explain in this essay, the crisis was, at least partially, the result of the actions 
of literally  myriad  actors: from those blatantly promoting and selling mortgages to people who 
might not really afford them, to those that took on the mortgages, those that securitized the 
mortgages, those that sold mortgage backed securities around the world, those that bought them, 
the governments and their regulations on the matter, and of course, in the end the governments and 
their plans to rescue failed financial institutions, among many, many other types of actors and 
interactions that resulted in the worst financial downturn in 80 years (Davis, 2010; Henisz, 2011; 
The Economist, 2013). Thus, even as many people did do things that contributed to the crisis and 
for which they should be held accountable, the overall change in the economic environment, is far 
more complex than any one single individual. In other words, there is probably not one single 
individual who could own the crisis (Rescher, 1996).  
 In sum, in complex environments, part of senior managers¶VHQVHPDNLQJLVWRUHFRJQL]H
their role as limited, where what happens in the organization, including the ways in which the 
organization could self-organize and lead itself, and what happens in the external environment, 
lies beyond the full control of senior managers. Under such conditions, as elegantly argued many 
years ago by Charles Lindblom, senior managers instead of owning the change process, 
sometimes, just merely muddle through (1959). It is this making sense of the environment as 
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something larger than them, which might allow for senior managers to then play the enabling role 
that it was previously argued for. Having said this, it is important to say that not all senior managers 
will arrive to such sensemaking, many would simply live in denial, pretending they control or can 
control everything. However, it is possible, that under such complex environments, some might 
arrive to the inevitable sense or interpretation that they are not under full control and neither could 
fully own their internal and external environments. This type of sensemaking I refer to as 
sensemaking as acceptance, and it represents the first face of the paradox. 
The second face of the paradox has to do with the rest of the people in the organization. If 
senior managers, as a result of facing complexity make sense of it in the acceptance mode here 
described, it would certainly be very difficult to share that level of understanding or acceptance 
with the rest of the people in the organization. Most people are actually not looking to understand 
their worlds as complex places where neither them nor their senior managers have full control 
over, and in which instead, LWLV³«choice, chance events, and industry and global changes [that] 
interact to produce unintended consequences that can play a decisive role in the success or failure 
RIRUJDQL]DWLRQV´(MacKay and Chia, 2013: 221). By contrast, most people make sense of their 
environments through simplistic plausible accounts that put order on the world (Lewandowsky et 
al., 2012; Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005))XUWKHUPRUHOLNH0DLWOLVDQG6RQHQVKHLQVWDWH³,Q
the absence of [sucK@DSODXVLEOHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHVLWXDWLRQ«DQ[LHW\ IHDUDQGIUXVWUDWLRQ
PD\LQFUHDVH´ (2010: 557). More importantly, as argued by the romance of leadership literature, 
many times such plausible simplistic accounts that put order on the world might involve blaming 
senior managers, like the CEO, for all success or failure (Bligh et al., 2011; Meindl et al., 1985). 
Therefore, as Bligh et al. (2011: 1059) argue, people in organizations when, 
faced with continually larger and ever more complex systems, there are many causal forces to consider that 
coexist in highly intricate and overlapping networks ² each with multiple inputs and outputs and feedback 
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loops ² that are continually evolving in a dynamic state of flux. Faced with this ever-increasing complexity, 
WRWDOFRPSUHKHQVLRQRIWKHV\VWHPDSSHDUVLPSRVVLEOH$VDUHVXOWWKH«>URPDQFHRIOHDGHUVKLS@KLJKOLJKWV
that sooner or later discussions of successes and failures, rights and wrongs, and past, present, and future 
outcomes will inevitably focus on leaders [such as senior managers]: their strengths and their shortcomings, 
what they did or did not do, should or should not have done, who they are, and perhaps most importantly, 
who we need them to be. 
 
These two faces of sensemaking under complexity, when looked at separately, might not 
generate any major controversy. However, the paradox, as expected, emerges when juxtaposing 
both of them. On the one hand, there are senior managers surrounded by possibly staggering 
complexity of which they need to make sense of. To make sense, they might come to realize that 
their internal and external environments are not under their full control (MacKay and Chia, 2013), 
and that in spite of all that they can actually do, rarely could they fully own anything in these 
environments. Thus, some might come to accept the limitations that surround them, and look for 
a way to just muddle through (Lindblom, 1959). On the other hand, as senior managers might 
come to accept complexity, people in their organizations, such as their subordinates, may start 
demanding from their senior managers to be presented as full causes of everything that is 
happening in the organization (Bligh et al., 2011; Meindl et al., 1985). Therefore, since people 
might struggle making sense of complexity, their easy way out of it might be to simply blame all 
success and all failure on senior managers, the senior managers that in order to survive might be 
precisely arriving at the opposite conclusion, resulting therefore, in the senior management 
sensemaking paradox. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
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The first point that I should clarify is that this is in no way a paper to exonerate senior managers 
for their deeds or misdeeds. The complexity perspective of leadership that I have here presented 
and the senior management sensemaking paradox, still acknowledge that senior managers do a lot 
and should be held accountable for what they do (MacKay and Chia, 2013; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, to be fairly held accountable, one needs to acknowledge how much of a process 
can/should actually be owned by a senior manager. This can be illustrated by going back to the 
financial crisis of 2008/09. During and after the global crisis, a lot of people started to argue 
whether senior leaders, such as President George W. Bush or key Wall Street CEOs, were 
responsible for the crisiVVRPHHYHQZHQWDOOWKHZD\EDFNWRFODLPWKDWLWZDV3UHVLGHQW&OLQWRQ¶V
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (i.e. the act separating commercial and investment banking in the 
US) that caused the crisis. The truth is that it is likely that all these people and their decisions had 
something to do with the crisis, and responsibility should be assigned accordingly and fairly. 
However, the overall event of the financial crisis was the result of many, many, many, more 
decisions, actors, and their interactions. 
 A second important point is how the paradox might be resolved. First of all it should be 
said that it might be the case that the paradox has no solution. At the end, that is the destiny of 
many paradoxes. So obsessing with a solution would not always be the best path to follow. 
Sometimes the paradox itself, even unanswered, might be valuable because it provides a useful 
educational tool in order to understand what it feels to be in a senior management position. In other 
words, when senior management comes to be conceived through this paradox, we immediately 
start wondering how absurd, lonely, powerless, contradictory, and irrational it might feel to be in 
a senior position, where you realize you do not control everything around you, but people want 
you to pretend you do. Therefore, for senior managers not finding a solution to the paradox could 
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derive in some potential and serious consequences. One, for instance, could be the classic case of 
how lonely it might (sometimes) become to be in a senior management position (Lee and Tiedens, 
2001; Stybel and Peabody, 2013). Entrepreneur Kamakshi Sivaramakrishnan illustrated this point, 
when in an interview to The New York Times, described the difficult conundrum of senior 
PDQDJHUV¶ORQHOLQHVV³Over time you learn to create a layer of insulation between your employees 
and the reality you feel as the leader and the pressure to deliver for investors. It is truly lonely, and 
,GRQ¶WPHDQORQHO\LQDGHVSRQGHQWZD\´ (in Bryant, 2016: 2). Moreover, for a senior manager 
dwelling in this paradox while not resolving it, simply hanging in there, could derive in other 
possible emotional challenges, such as anxiety. This relates, therefore, to the psychoanalytic idea 
RIOHDGHUV¶QHJDWLYHFDSDELOLW\%DVHGRQDQHDUO\FRQFHSWLRQE\.HDWVQHJDWLYHFDSDELOLW\UHIHUV
³SUHFLVHly [to] the ability to tolerate anxiety and fear to stD\LQWKHSODFHRIXQFHUWDLQW\´(Eisold, 
2000: 65). So senior managers that stay and dwell in the state of this sensemaking paradox, might 
QHHGWROHDUQKRZWR³«literally be in a position where«>WKH\@ do not know what is actually 
going on´ (Simpson and French, 2006: 245).  
Having started with this warning, I will now explore some possible solutions or attempts 
to solve the paradox. Several possibilities emerge on how senior managers try to cope or not with 
the paradox. The first and perhaps simpler case is that of a senior manager in denial. Many senior 
managers do not ever come to acceptance. By contrast, they live in denial, believing that they have 
full control, until something happens, like for example a financial crisis, which shows them they 
do not. Then, the frustration might overtake them, because it can be devastating to live pretending 
you control an organization, and then come to find out you do not. However, sometimes, even 
when facing information that disproves the belief of senior managers that they have full control, 
senior managers could continue believing in their hegemony and their almighty influence. This 
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might derive in a sort of self-deceptive leadership (Brown and Jones, 2000; von Hippel and Trivers, 
2011), where unwelcome information is suppressed.  
Another alternative is that of the senior manager that tries to reason with  people. We saw 
WKLVIRUH[DPSOHLQ$ODQ*UHHQVSDQ¶VFRQJUHVVLRQDOWHVWLPRQ\DIWHUWKHFULVLVZKHUHhe certainly 
tried to persuade people by explaining how the global economy is a complex and largely 
unpredictable system. Yet, these attempts might not always end up satisfactorily, as people might 
still just prefer simplistic and already held causal models that blame everything on one key senior 
manager or person (Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  
A final way to solve the paradox that I will discuss is what could be referred as double face 
senior management. In this case, senior managers come to accept the complexity of the world that 
surrounds them. However, they do not publicly admit their actual thinking. By contrast, since 
people want simple explanations, they give that to them by taking and accepting always all the 
blame for everything. This is certainly easy to do when senior managers are blamed for all success 
and have to take all the glory. However, it is not so easy when senior managers are blamed for all 
failure and have to take all the blame (Bligh and Schyns, 2007), even in ways that might not be 
fair. Thus, in a world of complexity, senior management is no longer about heroic managers having 
full control of their organizations, but probably about senior managers pretending they have 
control and taking the blame of all success and failure, giving people, then, at least some cognitive 
peace of mind. 
  In conclusion, I started this paper by arguing that complexity theory has come to perceive 
organizations, their environments, and leadership in a very different and novel manner. 
Complexity theory focuses on the interactions among the plethora of elements that constitute a 
system and the peculiar behaviors that result from this (Allen and Boulton, 2011; Allen et al., 2007; 
Journal of Strategy and Management 0(0) 
17 
 
McMillan, 2004). From a complexity perspective, leadership is no longer in an individual, but 
emerges from the interactions among many actors (Lichtenstein and Plowman, 2009; Marion and 
Uhl-Bien, 2001; Uhl-Bien et al., 2007). Under such a perspective, the question then emerges on 
what senior managers¶ UROH LV , VDLG WKDW IURP D FRPSOH[LW\ OHDGHUVKLS SHUVSHFWLYH VHQLRU
managers become enablers of  emergent complex adaptive processes of self-organization. 
Furthermore, I said that sensemaking possibly remained a key role for senior managers (Gioia and 
Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia et al., 1994). While analyzing senior managers¶ VHQVHPDNLQJ, it was 
shown that a possibility is for them to make sense of the world by accepting their limitations and 
the unowned and uncontrollable essence of many processes that surround them (MacKay and Chia, 
2013; Pye, 2005). However, while senior managers¶PLJKWUHDOL]H their limitations, people in their 
organizations might be demanding from them to take full responsibility of what senior managers 
know is not fully their doing (Bligh et al., 2011; Meindl et al., 1985). I called this the senior 
management sensemaking paradox. To solve the paradox, several alternatives were discussed. 
However, one that I mainly discussed was that of double face senior management: senior managers 
privately come to terms with the complexity that surrounds them and all that is beyond their 
control, while at the same time publicly accepting blame for all success and failure in order to give 
some peace of mind to their people. It is in this way, therefore, that senior managers come to be 
perceived in a different way, no longer as heroes, but simply as trapped between contrasting and 
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